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Attila Lindner – Balázs Reizer 
Abstract  
 
In November 2005, the Hungarian government frontloaded the unemployment benefit path, 
while kept constant the total benefit amount that could be collected over the unemployment 
spell. We estimate the effect of this reform on non-employment duration using an 
interrupted time series design. We find that non-employment duration fell by 1.5 weeks after 
November 2005, while reemployment wages and the duration of new jobs remained the 
same. We show that the decrease in non-employment duration was large enough to make the 
benefit reform revenue neutral. Our welfare evaluation for this reform is positive: 
frontloading increased job finding, it made some of the unemployed better off, and did not 
cost anything to the taxpayers. 
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A munkanélküli segély átütemezésének hatásai 
Lindner Attila – Reizer Balázs  
 
Összefoglaló 
 
2005 novemberében jelentősen megváltoztak a munkanélküli segély kifizetésével kapcsolatos 
szabályok. A korábbi havi fix segélyt egy időben csökkenő segélypálya váltotta fel, miközben a 
teljes jogosultsági idő alatt megszerezhető segély összege nem változott. Dolgozatunkban azt 
vizsgáljuk, hogy milyen hatással volt ez a reform a munkanélküliség hosszára. Eredményeink 
szerint a munkanélküliség átlagos hossza 1,5 hetet csökkent a reform után, míg az új 
munkahelyen elöltött idő és az új elhelyezkedés utáni bérek nem változtak. Végül bemutatjuk, 
hogy a gyorsabb elhelyezkedés elegendő volt ahhoz, hogy ellensúlyozza a bőkezűbb 
járadékszabályok okozta költségvetési kiadásnövekedést. Értékelésünk szerint a reform 
növelte a társadalmi jólétet, mivel a munkanélküliek anyagilag jobban jártak és hamarabb 
elhelyezkedtek a reform után, miközben nem növekedett a munkanélküli segélyek 
erőforrásigénye. 
 
Tárgyszavak: munkanélküliség, időben csökkenő munkanélküli segély, jóléti elemzés 
JEL kódok: H20, J64 
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In November 2005, the Hungarian government frontloaded the unemployment beneﬁt path,
while kept constant the total beneﬁt amount that could be collected over the unemployment
spell. We estimate the eﬀect of this reform on non-employment duration using an interrupted
time series design. We ﬁnd that non-employment duration fell by 1.5 weeks after November
2005, while reemployment wages and the duration of new jobs remained the same. We show
that the decrease in non-employment duration was large enough to make the beneﬁt reform
revenue neutral. Our welfare evaluation for this reform is positive: frontloading increased
job ﬁnding, it made some of the unemployed better oﬀ, and did not cost anything to the
taxpayers.
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1 Introduction
Unemployment insurance programs aim to protect against ﬁnancial distress at job loss and to main-
tain incentives to search for jobs. Unfortunately, these two goals are often in conﬂict: an insurance
that provides better protection often leads to moral hazard and , as a result, to longer unemploy-
ment duration. This classic trade-oﬀ between insurance value and moral hazard determines the
optimal level of the unemployment beneﬁt (Baily, 1978; Chetty, 2008).
However, the classic analysis of optimal unemployment insurance (UI) assumes that the beneﬁt
is constant throughout the unemployment spell. Changing the beneﬁt path, in principe, can
maintain the insurance aspects of UI and can provide more incentives to search for a job at
the same time. For instance, consider a change that frontloads the beneﬁt proﬁle by raising
the unemployment beneﬁt with $1 in the ﬁrst period and by cutting it with $1 in the second
period. Under this beneﬁt change, the short-term unemployed can collect more beneﬁts, while the
long-term unemployed collect the same amount of beneﬁt throughout their unemployment spell.
Therefore, beneﬁt frontloading makes none of the unemployed worse oﬀ and makes some oﬀ them
better oﬀ.
The potential downside eﬀect of such a policy change is that the total revenue of the UI system
might increase. Such an increase in costs would eventually increase taxes and make taxpayers
worse oﬀ. However, the eﬀect of frontloading on government spending is ambiguous. On the one
hand, the cost of UI increases mechanically as some of the unemployed collect more beneﬁts. On
the other hand, frontloading might speed up the transition to employment which leads to less
beneﬁt pay-outs and more tax revenues. In fact, this behavioral response can be large enough to
fully oﬀset the mechanical cost increase caused by beneﬁt frontloading.
1
Therefore, the beneﬁt frontloading described here can lead to a win-win situation where some
of the unemployed are made better oﬀ without making any other actors worse oﬀ. However, it
remains an empirical question whether the cost savings caused by the behavioral responses is large
enough to oﬀset the mechanical cost increase induced by the reform. This paper provides the ﬁrst
empirical assessment to answer this question. We exploit a unique Hungarian reform that changed
radically the time proﬁle of UI payments (see Figure 1). The unemployed who claimed beneﬁt
before 1st of November 2005 could rely on a constant beneﬁt for 270 days. However, those who
claimed beneﬁt after November 1st were eligible to the same beneﬁt amount, but in a diﬀerent
structure: they had higher beneﬁt in the ﬁrst 90 days and then lower in the next 180 days. Putting
it simply, the Hungarian UI reform frontloaded the beneﬁt proﬁle while the total beneﬁt that could
be collected remained the same.
We assess the eﬀect of this unique policy change on non-employment duration using admin-
istrative data on UI claimants and social security contributions. Our main empirical strategy
compares non-employment durations for those who claimed beneﬁt before the UI change,and were,
therefore, left with the old beneﬁt schedule, to those who claimed afterwards. We implement an
interrupted time series analysis and show that the average non-employment duration was stable
preceding the reform, while there was a sharp drop in non-employment duration that coincides
with the timing of the reform. We estimate that non-employment duration decreased by 10 days,
or 1.5 weeks after the reform.
We also examine the eﬀect of the beneﬁt change on the quality of jobs found. We do not ﬁnd
any evidence for a change in reemployment wages or in the duration of new jobs. Therefore, our
estimates suggest that the shortened unemployment duration did not lead workers to accept worse
(or better) jobs.
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We then we translate the estimated eﬀects into changes in the UI budget (Table 6). The new
beneﬁt mechanically increased governmental spending, because short-term unemployed collected
more beneﬁts. However, it also fastened up job ﬁnding, which decreased spending on unemploy-
ment beneﬁts. These eﬀects oﬀset around 50% of the mechanical cost increase. Another oﬀsetting
channel is the increase in personal income tax and social security contributions. This latter oﬀset
another 70% of the mechanical cost increases, and so the behavioral responses were large enough
to counterbalance the mechanical cost increase caused by the reform.
Our estimates allow us to examine the welfare implications of the reform. The beneﬁt front-
loading made the short-term unemployed better oﬀ as they were able to collect more beneﬁts after
the reform. Moreover, long-term unemployed have collected the same amount beneﬁt throughout
the unemployment spelland, as a result, they were able to consume the same as before.1 Therefore,
no unemployed was made worse oﬀ by this reform, and many of them was made better oﬀ.
Our estimates also imply that the burden on taxpayers did not increase after the reform. This is
because the extra beneﬁt collected by the unemployed was oﬀset by the beneﬁt savings and extra
taxes paid as a result of the shorter unemployment spells. Moreover, the unemployed did not
accept lower paying or less stable jobs. Therefore, the evidence presented here shows that beneﬁt
frontloading was a win-win policy: both the unemployed and the employed were made better oﬀ
byreceiving more generous unemployment beneﬁt schedule but in a structure that reduced moral
hazard. Therefore, the Hungarian UI reform was a Pareto improving policy change.
The key assumption behind our empirical strategy is that there were no other policy or economic
1Unemployed in the new system can replicate the old consumption proﬁle by saving some of the extra dollars
they got at the beginning of their unemployment spell. However, even if the unemployed can not save, they are
better oﬀ as long as the pre-reform beneﬁt was constant throughout the unemployment spell. Moreover, it is easy
to show that hand-to-mouth unemployed are also better oﬀ in that case.
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changes that could explain the sharp drop in non-employment duration after the reform The
aggregate unemployment rate was stable in this period and the composition of the unemployed
who claimed beneﬁt was similar before and after the reform suggesting that economic changes
cannot explain the change in non-employment duration. The only important policy change that
could aﬀect our results is a voulantary reemployment bonus scheme (RB), which was introduced
parallel with the beneﬁt reform.
To separate the eﬀect of the reemployment bonus scheme from beneﬁt frontloading, we exploit
the local variation in knowledge about the availability of the new bonus scheme similarly to Chetty
et al. (2013). While UI oﬃces provided clear and straightforward information to all newly unem-
ployed about the level and the timing of their beneﬁt, the availability ofthe reemployment bonus
scheme was less salient. Moreover, the reemployment bonus scheme was quite complicated and it
was also associated with substantial hassle costs. Therefore, the role of local UI oﬃces was crucial
to advocate the scheme.
We infer the unemployed access to information from the average bonus take-up rate at the local
UI oﬃce where the beneﬁt was claimed. There are a large and persistent diﬀerences in take-up
rates across UI oﬃces that are not related to observable characteristics of the unemployed. In some
locations the take-up rate was close to zero, while in others it went above 10%. We show that the
size of the drop in non-employment duration after the reform was very similar in zero or very low
take-up and high take-up locations. This suggest that access to information on the voluntary RB
scheme is unlikely to have had any signiﬁcant eﬀect on non-employment duration.
This paper is related to the literature on estimating moral hazard implications of unemploy-
ment insurance. Numerous studies scrutinized the eﬀect of changing the beneﬁt level (e.g. Meyer
1990; Lalive et al. 2006; Landais 2015; Card et al. 2007) and most papers found that there is a
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considerable eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on job search behavior (see a survey of this literature
by Krueger and Meyer 2002; Chetty and Finkelstein 2013). Other aspects of unemployment insur-
ance systems have been examined, such as reemployment bonuses (Van der Klaauw and Van Ours,
2013) and enforcement (Van den Berg and Van der Klaauw, 2006; Cockx and Picchio, 2013). How-
ever, the empirical evidence on the eﬀect of changing the beneﬁt path is surprisingly limited. A
notable exception is Kolsrud et al. (2015), who empirically estimate the moral hazard costs of
unemployment beneﬁts paid at diﬀerent times during the unemployment spell. They ﬁnd that the
unemployed respond more to beneﬁt changes at the beginning of the UI spell than towards the
end. Our results imply the opposite: the eﬀect of increasing the beneﬁt at the beginning has a
smaller eﬀect than the decrease later on. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that
the reform in Hungary is more radical and more salient than the one analyzed in Kolsrud et al.
(2015) In our setup, therefore, the unemployed are more likely to be aware of future drops in their
beneﬁts and so they will respond more to them.
Our results also contribute to the extensive theoretical literature on the optimal time proﬁle
of unemployment insurance (e.g. Shavell and Weiss 1979; Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997; Cahuc
and Lehmann 2000; Werning 2002; Shimer and Werning 2008). These papers derive the fully
optimal UI proﬁle but they need to make strong assumptions about the environment in which
the unemployed make their decisions (e.g. borrowing constraints). It turns out that the optimal
UI proﬁle is very sensitive to these assumptions (Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997; Werning, 2002).
Moreover, the fully optimal beneﬁt schedule is often quite complicated and hard to implement.
Therefore, instead of searching for the fully optimal UI beneﬁt schedule, we look at the welfare
implication of an easily implementable reform that moves away from the standard constant beneﬁt
schedule to a frontloaded one. Our approach will not come up with the ﬁrst-best beneﬁt proﬁle,
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but may help to inform policy makers as to which direction they should deviate in order to ﬁnd it.
We also contribute to the eﬀect of unemployment insurance on job quality. Recent research ﬁnds
mixed results on the UI wage eﬀect (Schmieder et al., 2013; Nekoei and Weber, 2015). Similarly to
Lalive (2007) and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between
the length of unemployment and reemployment wages.
The paper is set out as follows. Section 2 describes the data and institutional details of our
unemployment insurance reform. Section 3 presents the empirical results. In Section 4 we use our
empirical estimates to assess the welfare implications of reform. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Data
2.1 The Beneﬁt Reform in Hungary
Hungary had a two-tier unemployment insurance system around 2005. In the ﬁrst tier the unem-
ployment beneﬁt depended on the length and amount of contributions2. After exhausting the ﬁrst
tier, the unemployed were eligible for unemployment assistance. The amount of the beneﬁt in the
second tier was the same for all unemployed and the length of it depended on the age of the UI
claimants. After both tiers were exhausted, the unemployed were eligible for welfare. However,
welfare payments, unlike the UI beneﬁt, depended on family income and it were lower than the
unemployment beneﬁt.
The UI reform in 2005 changed the beneﬁt schedule dramatically in the ﬁrst tier for those who
claimed beneﬁt after November 1st, 2005, while it kept unaﬀected the length of unemployment
2The length of eligibility was the number of working days in the last four years divided by 5 and it was capped
at 270 days. The amount of the beneﬁt was based on the average monthly taxable income in the last year before
unemployment and it was also capped.
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beneﬁt. In our analysis we concentrate on the unemployed who experienced a frontloaded beneﬁt
as a result of the reform. These unemployed are individuals who worked more or less uninterrupted
in the preceding four years of their job loss and whose earnings base was above HUF108,000 ($504)
in 2005 (around the 70th percentile of UI claimants). Figure 1 summarizes the beneﬁt path for this
group before and after the reform. Unemployed individuals who claimed beneﬁt before November
1st were eligible for HUF44,460 ($222) for the ﬁrst 270 days. As opposed to this, those who claimed
beneﬁt after November 1st got HUF68,400 ($342) in the ﬁrst 90 days and HUF34,200 ($171) in the
next 180 days. An important feature of the reform was that the total beneﬁt that could be received
throughout the unemployment spell remained approximately the same and only the timing of the
beneﬁt payouts changed.
Newly unemployed individuals who wished to collect unemployment beneﬁts had to go the
local UI oﬃce and attend a 30-minute session which explained their rights and obligations as a
claimant. Then each individual received a personalized letter which characterized their beneﬁt
schedule in the ﬁrst tier. Figure A-1 shows an example of the ﬁrst page of such a letter for an
unemployed individual who claimed beneﬁt under the new rules. The beneﬁts are highlighted in
the table in the middle of the page, wherethe length of the disbursement period in days and the
daily amount are shown. It is obvious that the beneﬁt schedule was salient from the beginning of
the unemployment spell.
There were two other changes that were implemented in 2005. First, unemployment assistance
(UA- the second tier) was shortened from 180 days to 90 for those who claimed beneﬁt after
February 5th, 2005. Second, the government introduced a voluntary reemployment bonus (RB)
scheme in parallel with the beneﬁt reform. Under this new scheme, the unemployed who claimed
beneﬁt after November 1st, 2005 and found a job in the ﬁrst 270 days could claim 50 percent of
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the remaining unemployment beneﬁt as a lump sum. The take-up rate of the RB scheme was very
low as only 6 percent of the unemployed took advantage of this new scheme. Claiming UI beneﬁt
had two important drawbacks. First, the default option was not to take up RB and if someone
decided to make use of it, she had to go through a complicated administrative process3. Second,
claiming RB also meant that the remaining beneﬁt eligibility was lost. Therefore, RB claimants
had to start to collect beneﬁt eligibility from zero again, and this may have seemed a risky step
to take for many newly employed worker on probation. In Section 3 we do a couple of robustness
checks to show that the changes in non-employment durations were unlikely to be driven by the
shorter UA beneﬁts in the second tier or by the voluntary RB scheme.
Finally, it is worth highlighting that the economy was growing at around 3-4% before the
reform and a somewhat lower level afterwards (see Figure A-2 Panel a). Nevertheless, aggregate
labor market conditions were not aﬀected by the lower performance of the economy and aggregate
unemployment was stable around the period of our analysis (see Figure A-2 Panel b).4
2.2 Database and sample deﬁnition
We observe a 50 percent random sample of the unemployed registered at the Hungarian National
Employment Service between January 2004 and 20085. During this time period we have informa-
tion on the amount to which one is eligible and the starting and ending date of unemployment
beneﬁt spells. We also observe employment history and the earnings from social security contri-
3RB could only be claimed in person at the local unemployment oﬃce when 270 days elapsed after the beneﬁt
claim. Moreover, the employment status had to be continuous between the reemployment and the RB claim.
4The lower GDP growth rate would predict that non-employment duration is higher after the reform. However,
in Section 3 we show that the average length of employment was in fact lower after the reform. Therefore, if the
change in GDP had some eﬀect on our results, then we are likely to underestimate the true eﬀect of the reform.
5The sample includes individuals who were born every second day after January 1st, 1927.
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butions between 2002 and 2008.
We restrict attention to prime age workers (25-49 years) who had 270 days beneﬁt eligibility.
To analyze the eﬀect of the reform, we compare the average length of beneﬁt duration before
and after the reform. As ﬁgure Figure 1 shows, the before group consists of the unemployed who
claimed beneﬁt between 15th November 2004 and 15th October 2005. We leave out workers who
claimed beneﬁt around 1st of November to make sure we do not include in the analysis workers
who postponed their beneﬁt claims in order to get into the new system. In any case, the number
of claimants around November 1st is not unusual relative to previous years, which indicates that
most of the unemployed did not manipulate their claiming date because of the reform.
The after group is made up by the unemployed who claimed beneﬁt between November 15th,
2005 and October 15th, 2006. By using this sample deﬁnition, the before and the after group
consists ofthe same months of the year , so seasonality does not confound our results.
The basic descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1. We observe approximately 7500 un-
employed both before and after the reform.The observable characteristics of the two groups are
very similar. The share of women and the average year of education is slightly larger in the after
sample but the average income before unemployment was the same in both groups. The average
time spent between job loss and beneﬁt claim was 31 days both before and after the reform, which
indicates that people who lost their jobs before the reform did not postpone their beneﬁt claim
to become eligible for the new beneﬁt schedule. Finally, less than 6 percent of the unemployed
claimed reemployment bonus.
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3 Results
In this section we evaluate the impact of the reform on non-employment duration and on the quality
of jobs found. Figure 4 shows the Kaplan-Meier survivor rate for those who claimed beneﬁt before
(between November 15th, 2004 and October 15th, 2005) and after the reform (between November
15th, 2005 and October 15th, 2006). In the ﬁrst 90 days, the two job survivor functions are very
similar. After 3 months the job ﬁnding rate of the after group rises compared to the before group.
As a result, a signiﬁcantly higher share of workers ﬁnds a job during the ﬁrst 270 days after the
reform than before the reform.
To estimate the eﬀect of the reform on the length of unemployment, we estimate the following
regression:
NonEmpDuri = α + βafteri + γXi + εi (1)
where the dependent variable shows the time elapsed between beneﬁt claim and re-employment.
We cap the length of unemployment at 270 days because the reform aﬀected the beneﬁt eligibility
only in the ﬁrst 270 days. However, capping at a higher level does not substantially change the
results. The main variable of interest is the afteri dummy which indicates whether the unemployed
individual claimed beneﬁt after the reform. Xi denotes the control variables that include age, age
square, years of education and its square, log income in 2002, log income in 2003, sex, dummies
that control for the day of the month the beneﬁt was claimed, one digit occupation and location
dummies.
Table 2 summarizes the main ﬁndings of the paper. According to Column 1, the length of
non-employment decreased by 10.46 (s.e. 2.11) days after the reform. In Column 2 we take into
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account the fact that the characteristics of UI claimants diﬀer slightly before and after the reform.
The results show that the decline in duration is even bigger now: 11.28 (s.e. 2.10) days. In Column
3 we also control for the location where the beneﬁt was claimed. The estimated eﬀect of the reform
is 12.18 (s.e. 2.90) in that case.
As robustness check for the functional form we also estimate the eﬀect of the reform using the
Cox proportional hazard model:
hd = δdexp(λafter + κX) (2)
where hd denotes the re-employment hazard d days after the beneﬁt has been claimed, δd is
an unrestricted day eﬀect (baseline hazard), and the control variables, X, are the same as in
equation 1. The Cox hazard model shows similar eﬀects. According to the right panel of Table 2,
the reemployment hazard increased with 4-6 percent after the reform and the inclusion of control
variables do not signiﬁcantly alter the point estimates.
Our estimates indicate that after the reform, non-employment duration was lower by 10-12
days. Figure 3 panel (a) plots the average length of non-employment by six month periods relative
to the beneﬁt change. The gap shows that non-employment duration was around 197 days in
the preceding 6 month periods and that has been dropped to 187 days immediately after the
reform. In Figure 3 panel (b) we show the average non-employment duration after controlling for
observables and location ﬁxed eﬀects. Again the the change in non-employment duration is very
much coincided with the implementation of the new beneﬁt schedule. The ﬁgures also highlight
that the average length of non-employment was very similar in the last 18 month before the reform.
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Therefore, the change in the second tier after February 5th, 2005 had at most a small eﬀect on
non-employment duration. Given that the beneﬁt level in the second tier is quite low (HUF22,
800 or $114 per month) this is not surprising.
Did the faster reemployment hurt job quality? To answer this question we analyze other out-
comes besides the non-employment. duration. For example worker may accept a less stable job
after the reform to exit unemployment earlier (Jarosch, 2014). In Table 3 Column (1) to (3) we
estimate equation 1, where the outcome variable is the tenure at the new job. All columns show
a negative eﬀect on job tenure, but the estimated eﬀects (e.g. less than 1,5 days in Column 3) are
negligible in statistical and economic sense. The lack of eﬀect on job tenure at the new job has
been also conﬁrmed in Figure 5 where we plot the average tenure by six month periods relative to
the beneﬁt change (in Panel a without controls in Panel b with controlling for observables and UI
location ﬁxed eﬀects).
Figure 6 shows that frontloading did not aﬀect the reemployment wages either6. We plot
the log-ratio of the reemployment wage and the unemployment beneﬁt base wage by six month
periods.7 We control for a linear time trend to rule out the eﬀect of the inﬂation and economic
growth. The ﬁgure shows that the average reemployment monthly wage is 46-48 log-point lower8
As the unemployment beneﬁt base wage calculated based on the average earnings in the last four
years, this measure overestimates the income loss after unemployment (Card et al., 2007; Schmieder
6We calculate the daily reemployment wage from the social security data by dividing the monthly earnings by
the number of days worked in that month.
7The unemployment beneﬁt base wage was calculated by the unemployment insurance oﬃce based on the average
(daily) wage in the last four years. The unemployment beneﬁt base wage was not aﬀected by severance payment,
which was 1 to 6 months' salary depending on the tenure. The average daily wage calculated from the social security
data also include severance payments. This means that the log-ratio of the reemployment wage and the wage in
the last job overestimates the true wage loss for those who received severance payments.
8This diﬀerence is equivalent to a 37 percent decrease.
12
et al., 2013). In any case, Figure 6 highlights that reemployment wages are not aﬀected around
the time of the unemployment beneﬁt reform.
Table 4 reports the point estimates for the log-ratio of the reemployment wage and the base
wage. According to Column 1, the reemployment wage ratio was 1.6 (s.e. 2.1) percentage point
larger after the reform, but the raise was not signiﬁcant. The eﬀect on reemployment wage is
slightly higher, 2.7 (s.e. 1.7) once we control for observable characteristics of the unemployed
and the location ﬁxed eﬀects. While these point estimates are signiﬁcant in economic terms, we
should be cautious in drawing strong conclusions. First, none of these estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant at the conventional levels. Moreover, as it has been shown in Figure 6, the timing of the
increase in reemployment wages does not perfectly align with the implementation of the reform.
In Table 4 Column 4-9 we also explore alternative deﬁnitions of reemployment wages. Results
with log-ratio of the reemployment wage and the wage in the last job are shown in Column 4-6.
The results are slightly diﬀerent relative to the results in Column 1-3 as the point estimates are
near zero here. However, the wage in the last job is also is aﬀected by severance payments, and
so these estimate might be biased. Therefore, in Columns (7) to (9) we show the results for log-
ratio of reemployment wage and the average wage in 2002. The point estimate is again around 2
percentage points and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Overall, these results suggest that the eﬀect on reemployment wages might be positive or zero,
but it is unlikely to be negative. Therefore, we ﬁnd no evidence that the reform hurt job quality.
Can reemployment bonus explain the decrease in non-employment duration? As we discussed in
the previous section, those who claimed beneﬁt after November 1st, 2005 was not only faced with
the frontloaded beneﬁt schedule but were also eligible to claim voluntary reemployment bonus if
they found a job within 270 days. The reemployment bonus was associated with substantial hassle
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costs and it was a less salient policy than the beneﬁt frontloading. Still, it is possible that the
parallel introduction of the reemployment bonus explains part of the decline in non-employment
duration. To separate the eﬀect of beneﬁt frontloading from the reemployment bonus, we exploit
the anecdotal evidence that at some local UI oﬃces the reemployment bonus was advertised more
by UI oﬃcials than at other ones. While we do not observe directly which UI oﬃces have been
more keen on advocating the reemployment bonus scheme, we use the local level take-up rate of
the reemployment bonus as a proxy for information provided to the unemployed.
Two empirical observations motivate that the take-up rate is related to access to information
and not to other factors. First, Figure 7 panel (b) shows a scatter plot between the take-up rate one
year after the reform and the take-up rate 2 years after. The ﬁgure uncovers a strong correlation
(0.64) between take-up rate in the two periods. Therefore, the take-up rate diﬀerences across
locations are persistent. Second, and more importantly, Figure 8 shows scatter plots between
diﬀerent measures of the composition of the unemployed and the take-up rate by UI locations.
Panel (a) measures the composition of the unemployed by the average pre-reform non-employment
duration. We use the pre-reform non-employment duration and not the post-reform one, because
the post-reform does not just measure the composition of the unemployed but the eﬀect of the
reemployment bonus as well.9 Figure ?? Panel (b) measures the composition of unemployed by
the predicted non-employment duration for those who claim beneﬁt after the reform. To get the
predicted values we run a regression of non-employment duration on observable characteristics
9The measure of pre-reform non-employment duration is a good proxy of the post-reform composition of the
unemployed if the composition is stable over time. The correlation in non-employment duration between 1 year
before and 2 years before the reform is 0.31. Moreover, with all the caveats of using post-reform non-employment
duration to measure the composition of the unemployed, it is worth highlighting that there is no relationship between
non-employment duration and reemployment bonus take-up rate in the post-reform sample (results available on
request).
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(age, age square, years of education and its square, log income in 2002, log income in 2003, sex,
dummies that control for the day UI claimed, one digit occupation) in the pre-reform sample and
predict the average non-employment duration for the post-reform.
Both Panel (a) and Panel (b) in Figure ?? depicts the Kernel-weighted local polynomial smooth-
ing to show the non-parametric relationship between composition and take-up rate. In both panels
we see no relationship between these two variables if we abstract away from the few outliers with
very high take-up rates. This indicates that the reemployment bonus take-up rate is persistently
higher at some locations and the diﬀerences are not related to the composition of the unemployed.
This empirical pattern across UI locations is what we would expect to emerge if the take-up rate
was determined by the behavior of local UI oﬃcers and not some underlying economic factors.
The eﬀect of reemployment bonus on non-employment duration is likely to vary by the access to
information on the scheme. Similarly to Chetty et al. (2013), the variation in access to information
across locations can be used to better understand how reemployment bonus aﬀects our baseline
results. To do that, we compare low take-up rate (limited information) and high take-up rate (more
information) locations that experienced diﬀerences in non-employment duration. In particular, we
estimate the following regression:
unemploymenti = β1 + β2afteri + β3highi + β4highi ∗ afteri + γXi + εi (3)
where the dummy variable highi takes the value of 1 if the location is in the top quarter
(take-up rate is higher than 16.2%) and 0 if the location is in the lowest quartile (take-up rate is
lower than 4.9%) with respect to the reemployment bonus take-up rate. While this is a common
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence type regression, our main parameter of interest is not β4, namely the eﬀect
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of reemployment bonus on non-employment duration, but β1, the eﬀect of the reform on non-
employment duration at locations with close to zero take-up rate and limited information access.
Table 5 Column (1) to (4) summarizes the estimation results. In Column (1) and (3) we saw
the baseline results for the sample that includes the lowest and highest quartile locations with
low reemployment bonus take-up rate. The point estimates are slightly lower here than in the
baseline Table 2 (-8.65 vs. -10.46 in the speciﬁcation with no control and -12.18 vs. -10.70 in the
speciﬁcation with control and location FEs) and the diﬀerences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
In Column (2) and (4) we show the results on the same sample but estimating equation 3. The
results show that the eﬀect of the after dummy is virtually unaﬀected by controlling for high take-
up and its interaction with the after dummy. Moreover, the eﬀect of the interaction term is very
small and always insigniﬁcant. This indicates that the eﬀect of the reform does not vary by the
reemployment bonus take-up rate.
In Figure 9 we plot the relationship between the before-after change in non-employment dura-
tion and take-up rate across locations. We also plot the Kernel-weighted local polynomial smooth-
ing to show the non-parametric relationship between these two variables. The ﬁgure supports
our regression results in Table 5: there is no relationship between the eﬀect of the reform on
non-employment duration and the take-up rate.
As a robustness check, we report the estimates using Cox proportional hazard models. The
results are presented in Table 5 Column (1) to (4). The point estimates in Column (1) and (3)
are considerably higher in this sample. However, Column (2) and (4) highlights that these higher
eﬀects are virtually unaﬀected by whether the high take-up rate and its interaction with the after
dummy are included. Therefore, these results conﬁrm again that the eﬀect of the reform does not
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depend on the take-up rate.10
The results presented here underline that access to information (measured by variation in take-
up rate) on the reemployment bonus does not aﬀect the estimates in non-employment duration.
This is not surprising given that the reemployment bonus scheme was a very complicated, non-
salient policy with some substantial drawbacks, such as losing the remaining beneﬁt eligibility if
claimed. Therefore, our estimates indicate the the eﬀect of the reemployment bonus was negli-
gible, and the approximtaley 10 days decrease in non-employment duration can be attributed to
frontloading the beneﬁt schedule.
3.1 Eﬀect of the Reform on the Budget
Our results presented in the previous section indicate that non-employment duration decreased
considerably as a results of the beneﬁt frontloading. We use our estimates to understand the
budget consequences of this reform. The total budget needed to ﬁnance the ﬁrst 360 days of the
unemployed can be summarized by the following equation:
G =
360∑
t=1
btSt +
360∑
t=1
τw(1− St)
where τ is the tax rate, w is the reemployment wage, and bt and St is the beneﬁt schedule and
the survival rate t days after unemployment beneﬁt was claimed, respectively. We decompose the
change in total budget into two components:
10As a further robustness check, in Appendix Figure A-1 we show that the results are robust to controlling directly
for the share of workers who claimed reemployment bonus (and its interaction with the after dummy).
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∆G =
(∑360
t=1 b
post
t S
post
t +
∑360
t=1 τw(1− Spostt )
) − (∑360t=1 bpret Spret +∑360t=1 τw(1− Spret ))
=
360∑
t=1
Spret
(
bpostt − bpret
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
T∑
t=1
(
Spostt − Spret
)
(bpostt + τw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical UI spending increase UI spending decrease
caused by the reform caused by behavioral responses
(4)
where bpostt and b
pre
t are the daily pre- and post beneﬁt shown on Figure 1, while S
post
t and S
pre
t
is the daily pre and post survival rate shown in Figure 4. The ﬁrst term in the decomposition
shows that an unemployed individual who ﬁnds a job quickly collects more beneﬁt under the new
system and this mechanically increases the government spending on UI. The second term captures
the budget consequences of the behavioral responses to the reform: due to faster reemployment,
spending on UI decreases and tax revenues increase. It remains an empirical question whether the
mechanical or the behavioral eﬀect has a larger inﬂuence on the budget.
Table 6 summarizes the key eﬀects of the reform on the budget. It shows that in the absence
of behavioral responses, beneﬁt frontloading would have increased mechanically beneﬁt payments
by $119. However, beneﬁt frontloading sped up reemployment, which decreased spending on
UI beneﬁts by $57. Moreover, ﬁnding jobs earlier also lead to higher UI contributions, which
is equivalent to an additional $8. From the government point of view, revenues outside the UI
budget should also be taken into account. The wage related taxes and contributions paid because
the unemployed ﬁnd jobs quicker increased the revenue of the budget with an additional $90.
To sum up, the mechanical increase of UI expenditures were $119 while the behavioral response
of the unemployed improved the balance of the budget by $156, which suggests that frontloading
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improved the budget by $36 per unemployed. We also calculated the standard errors around these
estimates by bootstrapping.11 While at the conventional conﬁdence levels we cannot rule out that
the eﬀect of the reform on the UI budget is negative, our estimates indicate that it is unlikely that
the reform had a negative eﬀect on it.12
4 Welfare Assessment
Our estimates in the previous section can be used to assess the welfare implications of frontloading.
We use the stylized job search model of Chetty (2008) and Kolsrud et al. (2015) to highlight the
key channels through with beneﬁt frontloading aﬀect welfare.
4.1 Set-up
We consider a discrete time model of job search in which agents live for T periods. The representa-
tive agent starts as unemployed and searches for jobs in each period. Employment is an absorbing
state13, and so once a job is found, the unemployed will be employed at wage w for the rest of her
life.14
In each periods agents make two decisions: they choose search intensity st and consumption
level ct. Search intensity is costly and these costs are represented by c(st). We assume that the cost
function is convex, strictly increasing and twice diﬀerentiable. The value function of the employed
11We take 1000 random sample with replacement, then calculate the Kaplan-Meire survival rates and the implied
UI budget.
12The p-value of a one-sided hypothesis test on whether the budget eﬀect is negative is .14
13Relaxing this assumption complicates the calculation of the value of employment, but the main conclusions of
this section are not aﬀected.
14We assume that the change in beneﬁt proﬁle does not aﬀect reemployment wages, which is conﬁrmed by our
empirical analysis in Section 3.
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if t < T is
V Et (At) = maxAt+1u(c
e
t ) + v(G) + δV
E
t+1(At+1),
where δ is the discount factor, and V ET (At) = maxAt+1u(w+AT ) + v(G). The value of employ-
ment depends on private consumption, u(cet ), and on the consumption of public goods v(G). Both
u() and v() are strictly increasing, concave, twice diﬀerentiable functions. Assets earn a return
r per period so that consumers face a per-period budget constraint cet = w + At − At+11+r and a
borrowing constraint At ≥ L.15
The value function of the unemployed if t < T is
V Ut (At) = maxAt+1,stu(c
u
t )− c(st) + v(G) + δ
[
stV
E
t+1(At+1) + (1− st)V Ut+1(At+1)
]
,
where cut = bt + At − At+11+r and V UT (At) = u(bt + AT ) + +v(G). Again the value of employment
depends on public and private consumption.
Spending on the unemployment insurance system depends on the fraction of agents that stay
unemployed at period, St, and the beneﬁt paid out to these workers, bt. The total unemployment
beneﬁt payout equals
∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t
Stbt. The tax that can be collected depends on the fraction of
workers who are employed, 1− St, and on the tax rate, τ 16. Finally, the government spends G on
public goods and so the government deﬁcit, D, is deﬁned by the following formula:
15The presence of borrowing constraints does not aﬀect our results.
16We also include also social security contributions in taxes, because the link between contributions and future
beneﬁts is very weak for most workers (Summers, 1998).
20
D =
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
G+
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
Stbt −
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
(1− St) τw.
We assume that the deﬁcit must be kept constant, and so more spending on unemployment
insurance (while keeping constant the tax revenue), will decrease the amount of public goods
provided in the economy.
The UI beneﬁt was constant before November 1st, 2015 and so bt = b.
17 The Hungarian reform
increased the beneﬁt by 4˜b in the ﬁrst N periods and decreased by ∆b˜ afterwards, while the total
beneﬁt that can be collected throughout the unemployment spell remained constant, formally,
N∑
k=0
∆b1 +
T∑
k=N+1
∆b2 =
T∑
k=1
∆bk = 0. (5)
Notice that we require here that the total beneﬁt is kept constant in nominal terms and not in
present value terms. These two diﬀer if the interest rate, r, is positive. We make this assumption
to stick to the exact reform that occurred, however, the results are unaﬀected if the present value
of the total beneﬁt is kept constant instead.
4.2 Welfare implications
The value of unemployment at period 0 captures the expected utility of a newly unemployed agent.
We examine the eﬀect of beneﬁt change on this measure to understand the welfare implications of
frontloading.
17If the interest rate, r, is positive, then this beneﬁt path is slightly declining in present value terms.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that the unemployment beneﬁt is increased by 4˜b in the ﬁrst N
periods and decreased by ∆b˜ afterwards, while the total beneﬁt that can be collected throughout
the unemployment spell remained constant and so equation 5 applies.
Then the eﬀect of beneﬁt change on the value of unemployment at the beginning of the UI
spell is determined by the following formula:
4V U0 (A0) = u′ (cu∗0 ) ∆b0 +
N∑
k=1
δk
k∏
i=1
(1− s∗i )u′ (cu∗k ) ∆bk︸ ︷︷ ︸ −
∑
δkv′(G)4G︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare eﬀect caused by welfare eﬀect caused by
change in the beneﬁt change in public spending
≥ 0 S 0
The ﬁrst part of this expression, welfare eﬀect caused by change in the beneﬁt, is always non-
zero and it becomes positive if optimal search s∗t is positive for at least one period throughout
the unemployment spell or if the interest rate, r, is positive. Moreover, the second part of this
expression, the welfare eﬀect caused by the change in public spending, can be positive, negative
or zero depending on the sign of 4G. This 4G is the following:
∆G =
∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t
St4bt∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
∑T
t=14Stbt∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
∑T
t=14Stτ∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical UI spending increase UI spending decrease increase in tax revenue
caused by the reform caused by shorter UI spell caused by ﬁnding job sooner
Proposition 1 highlights that the beneﬁt change induced by frontloading increases the welfare
of the unemployed by increasing private consumption. This is because under the new UI beneﬁt
schedule the consumption proﬁle under the old rules can be replicated by saving the beneﬁt increase
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in the ﬁrst N periods and consuming them later. The new beneﬁt schedule, therefore, must provide
at least as high consumption utility as the old one, and as the proposition highlights, under some
week conditions it will be strictly higher.
However, the new beneﬁt schedule can increase the funding need of the UI system, which can
lead to cutting back spending on public goods, 4G. In principe, lowering public goods can oﬀset
the welfare gain caused by the consumption increase of the unemployed, but this is not necessarily
the case. Proposition 1 shows that the eﬀect on public spending is ambiguous and determined
by three diﬀerent factors. First, beneﬁt frontloading mechanically increases the spending on UI,
because the unemployed individuals who ﬁnd jobs relatively quickly collect more beneﬁts under the
new rule. Second, a sizable decline in non-employment duration decreases spending on UI beneﬁts.
Third, unemployed individuals who ﬁnd jobs quicker pay more taxes and increase government
revenue. While the ﬁrst eﬀect increases the cost of the unemployment insurance system, the
latter two eﬀects decrease it. It remains an empirical questions, therefore, which of these eﬀects
dominates.
The results in Section 3.1 calculate the change in 4G and show that in the Hungarian case
the behavioral responses were large enough to oﬀset the mechanical cost increase in the UI. This
implies that, in fact, 4G in fact increased and not decreased after the reform. Therefore, the
Hungarian beneﬁt change was clearly welfare improving, because not only did it increase private
consumption consumption of the unemployed, but it also saved some money for the government.
It is worth highlighting that the result presented in Proposition 1 is very robust to alternative
modeling assumptions. The presence of borrowing limits, unobserved heterogeneity among the
unemployed, or hand-to-mouth consumers do not inﬂuence the welfare implications presented
here.
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5 Conclusion
This paperpresented the Hungarian unemployment beneﬁt reform where a new frontloaded beneﬁt
path replaced the ﬂat beneﬁt system. The virtue of the reform was that the timing of the beneﬁt
was changed while the total amount of the beneﬁt that could have been collected stayed constant.
We provided evidence that beneﬁt frontloading speeded up reemployment and did not increase
the cost of the unemployment insurance system. This implies that the new beneﬁt schedule made
some unemployed deﬁnitely better oﬀ and none of them worse oﬀ. Moreover, given that the reform
increased government revenue , we conclude here that the Hungarian reform was welfare increasing.
Our results are in stark contrast with Kolsrud et al. (2015), who conclude that increasing the
beneﬁt proﬁle is likely to be welfare improving. The key diﬀerence between their ﬁndings and ours
is that they ﬁnd that the behavior response to a beneﬁt change at the beginning of the UI spell
does not diﬀer substantially from beneﬁt changes happening latter on. If this were true, we should
have found that the beneﬁt increase at the beginning of the UI oﬀsets the eﬀect of the beneﬁt
decrease that happened towards the end of the UI, and so the behavioral responses to frontloading
should be limited. As we showed above, our results does not support this prediction. While more
studies are needed to understand better the behavioral responses to a beneﬁt change, the key
advantage of our setup relative to Kolsrud et al. (2015) is that we analyze here a very transparent
and radical change in the UI beneﬁt that is likely to induce responses in job search even in the
presence of some adjustment costs (Chetty et al., 2013).
Finally, while this paper aims to evaluate the welfare implication of this reform, , in a related
paper DellaVigna et al. (2016) we exploit the same reform to evaluate competing job search models.
In that paper we show that a behavioral search model does a better job explaining the hazard
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rate to employment than the standard search models in the literature. Both papershighlight the
importance of the beneﬁt path, and suggest that redesigning the UI systems can sometimes break
the classic trade-oﬀ between moral hazard and insurance.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Comparing Means of Main Variables Pre- and Post UI Reform
before after diﬀ t-stat
Percent Women 40.37% 44.70% 4.33% 5.43
(0.55%) (0.57%)
Age in Years 36.82 36.89 0.07 0.60
(0.08) (0.08)
Imputed Education (years) 11.87 12.04 0.17 4.70
(based on occupation in the last job) (0.02) (0.02)
Log earnings in 2002 11.08 11.12 0.04 1.04
(0.02) (0.02)
Log earnings in 2003 11.29 11.31 0.02 0.48
(0.02) (0.02)
Waiting period* 31.24 31.56 0.32 0.52
(0.42) (0.44)
Reemployment bonus claimed 0.00% 5.91% 0.06 21.67
(0%) (0.27%)
Number of observations** 7,879 7,476
* number of days between job loss and UI claim
**there are some missing values for log earnings in 2002, 2003, 2004.
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Table 2: Baseline results: Eﬀect of the Reform on Non-Employment Duration
Non-employment duration (OLS) Reemployment hazards (Cox-estimation)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After -10.46*** -11.28*** -12.18*** 0.043** 0.057*** 0.064***
(2.11) (2.09) (2.29) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025)
Controls no yes yes no yes yes
Location FE no no yes no no yes
Observations 15,009 15,009 15,009 15,009 15,009 15,009
R-squared 0.002 0.042 0.063
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the eﬀect of the reform on non-employment duration. Column 1-3 estimate regression in
equation 1. Column 4-6 estimate the Cox proportional hazard in equation 2. The non-employment duration is
capped at 270 days in all columns. After is a dummy, which is 1 if the unemployed individual claimed beneﬁt after
the beneﬁt reform (between November 15th, 2005 and October 15th, 2006). The control variables are sex, age, age
square, waiting period (the number of days between job lost and UI claimed), the county of residence, day of the
month UI claimed , education, occupation (1 digit) in the last job, log earnings in 2002 and 2003. The location
ﬁxed eﬀects control for the local UI oﬃce where the unemployed individual claimed beneﬁt. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the local UI oﬃce level.
30
Table 3: Job Quality: Eﬀect of the Reform on Job Tenure in the New Job
Average tenure in days (OLS) Separation hazards (Cox-estimation)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
After -0.58 -1.03 -1.03 0.003 0.039 0.037
(1.78) (1.79) (2.00) (0.036) (0.037) (0.042)
Controls no yes yes no yes yes
Location FE no no yes no no yes
Observations 9,181 9,181 9,181 9,181 9,181 9,181
R-squared 0.000 0.017 0.045
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the eﬀect of the reform on the duration of the new job (measured in days). Column
1-3 estimate regression in equation 1 and Column 4-6 estimate the regression in 2 using the job tenure
upon reemployment. Only workers who found a job within 360 days are included in the sample. The
tenure is capped at 360 days in all columns. After is a dummy, which is 1 if the unemployed individual claimed
beneﬁt after the beneﬁt reform (between November 15th, 2005 and October 15th, 2006). The control variables are
sex, age, age square, waiting period (the number of days between job lost and UI claimed), the county of residence,
day of the month UI claimed , education, occupation (1 digit) in the last job, log earnings in 2002 and 2003. The
location ﬁxed eﬀects control for the local UI oﬃce where the unemployed individual claimed beneﬁt. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the local UI oﬃce level..
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Table 5: The eﬀect of Frontloading by the Reemployment Bonus Take-up Rate
Non-employment duration (OLS) Reemployment hazards (Cox-estimation)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
after -8.65*** -8.20*** -10.70*** -10.01*** 0.119*** 0.107** 0.151*** 0.129***
(1.85) (2.74) (1.88) (2.77) (0.033) (0.047) (0.030) (0.042)
high take-up 2.30 -0.032
(4.30) (0.047)
high take-up*after -0.85 -1.36 0.023 0.044
(3.70) (3.70) (0.066) (0.058)
controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
location FE no no yes yes no no yes yes
Observations 7,217 7,217 7,217 7,217 7,217 7,217 7,217 7,217
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.064 0.064
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the eﬀect of the reform on non-employment duration by the local reemployment bonus
take-up rate. The sample in all columns includes unemployed who claim beneﬁt in the UI locations with the lowest
quartile take-up rate and in the UI locations with the highest quartile take-up rate. Column 1, 3, 5 and 7 show the
baseline results for this partiuclar sample. Column 2 and 4 estimate equation 3 and Column 6 and 8 the estimate
a Cox proportinal hazard model. The length of non-employment is capped at 270 days in all Columns. The after
dummy is 1 if the unemployed claimed beneﬁt after the beneﬁt reform. The high take-up is a dummy denoting
that the unemployed claimed beneﬁt at a location withhighest quartile reemployment bonus take up The control
variables are sex, age, age square, waiting period (the number of days between job lost and UI claimed), the county
of residence, day of the month UI claimed, education, occupation (1 digit) in the last job, log earnings in 2002 and
2003. The location ﬁxed eﬀects control for the local UI oﬃce where the unemployed claimed beneﬁt. Standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the local UI oﬃce level.
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Table 6: The Eﬀect of the Reform on the Budget
Balance of the unemployment beneﬁt system s. e.**
before* $1605 (9.51)
Mechanical cost change $119 (2.21)
Change in beneﬁt spending because faster reemployment -$57 (12.86)
Change in UI contribution because more time in work -$8 (1.66)
after* $1662 (9.91)
Net increase in UI cost $54 (15.03)
Net gain in tax revenue
Taxes and contributions paid by the worker because more time in work $38 (8.14)
Contributions paid by the ﬁrm because more time in work $52 (11.12)
Change in government revenue $90 (19.07)
(Net gain in tax revenue - Net increase in UI cost) $36 (33.75)
*in the 1st year after UI claimed **bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis
Note: This table shows the eﬀect of the reform on the government budget. We decompose the eﬀect of the reform
into diﬀerent components based on equation 4 (see the text for details). Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses
are reported in the right column.
34
Figures
Figure 1: Beneﬁt Schedule Before and After the Reform
The ﬁgure shows the beneﬁt schedule if UI is claimed on October 31, 2005 (old beneﬁt schedule, dashed blue line)
and the beneﬁt schedule if UI is claimed on November 1st, 2005 (new beneﬁt schedule, solid red line) for individuals
who had 270 potential durations in the ﬁrst-tier, were less than 50 years old and earned more than 114,000 HUF
($570) prior to entering the UI scheme. The hypothetical beneﬁt level is shown under social assistance. Beneﬁt
levels of social assistance depended on family income, household size and wealth and we do not observe these
variables in our data.
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Figure 2: Before and After Comparison Groups
The ﬁgure shows the time frame for which we have access to administrative data on unemployment insurance
records, the time of the reform and how we deﬁne the before and after periods that we use for our before-after
comparison. The before sample consists of those unemployed who claimed UI between November 15th, 2004 and
October 15th, 2005, and the after sample consist unemployed who claimed UI between November 15th, 2005 and
October 15th, 2006.
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Figure 3: Baseline Results: Non-Employment Duration by 6-month Periods Relative to the Reform
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(b) With controls
The ﬁgure shows the seasonally adjusted average length of unemployment spells by 6-month periods. Panel (a)
shows the unconditional averages while Panel (b) controls for sex, age, age square, waiting period (the number of
days between job lost and UI claimed), the county of residence, day of the month UI claimed, education, occupation
(1 digit) of the last job, and log earnings in 2002 and 2003.The ﬁgure highlights that the average length of non-
employment duration dropped immediately after the reform. The vertical red line show the timing of the beneﬁt
frontloading. .
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier Survival Rates Before and After the Reform
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The ﬁgure shows the Kaplan-Meier survivor rates of the unemployed before and after the reform. The vertical red
line shows the drop in the beneﬁts after the reform at 90 and 270 days. The shaded area shows the conﬁdence
intervals of the survivor estimates.
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Figure 5: Job Quality: Job Tenure at the New Job Before and After the Reform
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(b) With controls
The ﬁgure shows the average length of the new employment spells by 6-month periods. The length of employment
is capped at 360 days and only workers who found a job within 360 days are included in the sample. Panel (a)
shows the unconditional averages while Panel (b) controls for sex, age, age square, waiting period (the number of
days between job lost and UI claimed), the county of residence, day of the month UI claimed, education, occupation
(1 digit) in the last job, and log earnings in 2002 and 2003. The vertical red line shows the timing of the beneﬁt
frontloading. The ﬁgure highlights that thelength of the new employment spells did not change after the reform.
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Figure 6: Job Quality: Reemployment Wages Before and After the Reform
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(b) With controls
The ﬁgure shows the log ratio of reemployment wage and the beneﬁt base by 6-month periods. Panel (a) shows
the unconditional averages while Panel (b) controls for sex, age, age square, waiting period (the number of days
between job lost and UI claimed), the county of residence, day of the month UI claimed, education, occupation
(1 digit) in the last job, and log earnings in 2002 and 2003. Both regressions include linear time trends and only
workers who found a job within 360 days are included in the sample. The vertical red line show the timing of the
beneﬁt frontloading. The ﬁgure highlights that reemployment wages did not change after the reform.
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Figure 7: Take-up Rate of Reemployment Bonus
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(b) Relationship between take-up rate 1 year and 2 years after the reform
Panel (a) shows the frequency distribution of local UI take-up rates . Panel (b) shows the take-up rate of reemploy-
ment bonus at local unemployment oﬃces one year and two year after the reform. The graph highlights that the
local take-up rate is persistent over time. In both panels only UI oﬃces with at least 30 UI claimants were used.
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Figure 8: Relationship between the Composition of UI Claimants and the Take-up Rate accross
Locations
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(a) Non-employment duration before the reform
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(b) Predicted non-employment duration after the reform
The ﬁgure plots the relationship between the composition of UI claimnts and the take-up rate of reemployment
bonus after the reform at all UI locations. Panel (a) measures the composition of UI claimants with the average
non-employment duration before the reform while panel (b) measures the composition of the unemployed by the
predicted non-employment duration for those who claimed beneﬁt after the reform. To get these predicted values
we run a regression of non-employment duration on observable characteristics in the pre-reform sample and predict
the average non-employment duration for the post-reform. The blue line shows the local polynomial ﬁt weighted by
the number of beneﬁt claims before the reform. In both panels only UI oﬃces with at least 30 UI claimants were
used. The ﬁgure shows that the reemployment bonus take-up is uncorrelated with the length of non-employment
before the reform.
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Figure 9: The Eﬀect of the Reform by the Take-up Rate of the Reemployment Bonus
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The ﬁgure plots the relationship between the before-after change in the average non-employment duration at the
local UI oﬃce and the reemployment bonus take-up rate. The blue line shows the local polynomial ﬁt weighted
by the number of beneﬁt claims before the reform. The ﬁgure shows no relationhsip between the change in non-
employment duration and the reemployment bonus take-up rate.
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Appendix
Figure A-1: Information Sheet Received by the Unemployed
The ﬁgure shows an example of the the ﬁrst page of the personalized information sheet received by an unemployed
individual when UI was claimed. According to the table in the middle, the receiver of the form was eligible for daily
HUF2280 for 90 days and daily HUF1140 for another 180 days.
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Figure A-2: GDP growth and unemployment rate in Hungary
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The ﬁgure shows the seasonally adjusted GDP growth rate (dashed red line) and the seasonally adjusted unem-
ployment rate (solid blue) between 2003 and 2008 in Hungary. The major (red) vertical lines indicate the period
we use for the before-after comparison. The data was obtained from the Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃce.
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Table A-1: The eﬀect of Frontloading by the Reemployment Bonus Take-up Rate
Non-employment duration (OLS)¹ Reemployment hazards (Cox-estimation)
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
after -9.50*** -8.67*** -10.29*** -8.74*** 0.143*** 0.132*** 0.164*** 0.140***
(1.72) (2.61) (1.70) (2.55) (0.028) (0.041) (0.027) (0.038)
take-up rate -0.135 0.002
(0.193) (0.003)
take-up rate*after -0.0800 -0.133 0.001 0.002
(0.136) (0.134) (0.002) (0.002)
controls no no yes yes no no yes yes
location FE no no yes yes no no yes yes
Observations 13,011 13,011 13,011 13,011 13,011 13,011 13,011 13,011
R-squared 0.002 0.042 0.003 0.043
Clustered standard errors by UI take-up locations in parentheses
¹Capped at 270 days.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: This table shows the eﬀect of the reform on non-employment duration by the local reemployment bonus
take-up rate. The sample in all columns includes those unemployed individuals who claimed beneﬁt in a UI oﬃce
that has had at least 30 RB claimants in our sample. Column 1, 3, 5 and 7 show the baseline results for this
particular sample. Column 2 and 4 estimate equation 3 and Column 6 and 8 estimate a Cox proportional hazard
model. We use continuous measure of take-up rate instead of using the high take-up rate dummy variable as in
Table 5. The length of non-employment is capped at 270 days in all columns. The control variables are sex, age,
age square, waiting period (the number of days between job lost and UI claimed), the county of residence, day of
the month UI claimed, education, occupation (1 digit) in the last job, log earnings in 2002 and 2003. The location
ﬁxed eﬀects control for the local UI oﬃce where the unemployed claimed the beneﬁt. Standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the local UI oﬃce level.
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A.1 The Eﬀect of the Reform on the Budget
Table 6 summarizes the eﬀect on the budget. We use equation 4. The bpostt and b
pre
t are the daily
pre- and post beneﬁts shown on Figure 1. Spostt and S
pre
t are the daily pre- and post- survival rates
shown in Figure 4. The average monthly gross reemployment wage was $509.
The following items are paid based on these gross earnings:
1. Unemployment insurance contributions. The UI contribution was 4.5% of the gross wage and
paid directly into the budget of the unemployment beneﬁt system. Given that the behavioral
eﬀect of the reform was around 10 days, the additional revenue of the beneﬁt budget was
around $509 ∗ (10/30) ∗ 4.5%).
2. Personal Income Tax. The income taxes were based on monthly earnings. The tax rate
below the minimum wage ($285) was 0, while above the minimum wage it was 18 percent.
This means that around ($509− $285) ∗ (10/30) ∗ 18% = $13.4 was paid in taxes.
3. Health insurance contribution. The health insurance contribution was a ﬁxed $9.75 per
month. The additional revenue eﬀect of that item was around (10/30) ∗ $9.75 = 3.25
4. Social security contribution (employee part). The social security contribution was 12.5
percent of the gross wage, and so the sum of taxes paid by the workers were around
$509 ∗ (10/30) ∗ 12.5% = $21.2
5. Social security contribution (employer part). Firms also needs to pay social security contri-
butions which is 30% of the gross wage so the contributions paid by the ﬁrm were around
$509 ∗ (10/30) ∗ 30% = $50.9
.
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A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. Suppose that the unemployment beneﬁt is increased by 4˜b in the ﬁrst N periods
and decreased by ∆b˜ afterwards, while the total beneﬁt that can be collected throughout the
unemployment spell remained constant, formally,
N∑
k=0
4˜b+
T∑
k=N+1
∆b˜ =
T∑
k=1
∆bk = 0. (6)
Then the eﬀect of beneﬁt change on the value of unemployment at the beginning of the UI spell
is determined by the following formula:
4V U0 (A0) = u′ (cu∗0 ) ∆b0 +
N∑
k=1
δk
k∏
i=1
(1− s∗i )u′ (cu∗k ) ∆bk︸ ︷︷ ︸ −
∑
δkv′(G)4G︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare eﬀect caused by welfare eﬀect caused by
change in the beneﬁt change in public spending
≥ 0 S 0
The ﬁrst part of this formula, welfare eﬀect caused by change in the beneﬁt, is always non-
negative, and it only becomes positive if optimal search s∗t is positive for at least one period
throughout the unemployment spell or if the interest rate, r, is positive. The second part of this
formula, the welfare eﬀect caused by change in public spending, can be positive, negative or zero
depending on the sign of 4G. Moreover, 4G will be determined by the following equation.
∆G =
∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t
St4bt∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
∑T
t=14Stbt∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
∑T
t=14Stτ∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical UI spending increase UI spending decrease increase in tax revenue
caused by the reform caused by shorter UI spell caused by ﬁnding job sooner
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Proof:
The value of unemployment is deﬁned by the following equation:
V Ut (At) = u (c
u∗
i )− c(s∗t ) + v(G) + δ
[
stV
E
t+1(A
∗
t+1) + (1− st)V Ut+1(A∗t+1)
]
Based on this the value of unemployment in period 0 can be rewritten as
V U0 (A0) =
T∑
k=0
δkv(G)+u (cu∗0 )−c (s∗0)+
T∑
k=1
δk
k∏
i=1
(1− s∗i ) [u (cu∗k )− c (s∗k)]+
T∑
k=1
δk
k−1∏
i=1
(1−s∗i )s∗kV Ek (A∗t+1)
Now we look at the change in beneﬁts described by equation 6. By the envelop theorem the
indirect eﬀect on the value function will be second order, and so the eﬀect of beneﬁt change on
the value function will be the following:
4V U0 (A0) = u′ (cu∗0 ) ∆b0 +
N∑
k=1
δk
k∏
i=1
(1− s∗i )u′ (cu∗k ) ∆bk︸ ︷︷ ︸ −
∑
δkv′(G)4G︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare eﬀect caused by welfare eﬀect caused by
change in the beneﬁt change in public spending
≥ 0 S 0
(7)
As we show next, the ﬁrst term is always positive, while the second term can be positive or
negative depending on the sign of4G. We will provide the expression for 4G later.
To show that the welfare eﬀect caused by the beneﬁt change is non-negative, we stipulate that
the optimal consumption path must satisfy the usual Euler equation:
u′ (cu∗t ) ≥ δ(1 + r)
[
s∗t
∂V Et+1(A
∗
t+1)
∂At+1
+ (1− s∗t )u′
(
cu∗t+1
)]
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This equation can be easily derived from the FOC of the value function with respect to At+1
and from the envelop theorem that indicates that
∂V Ut+1(A
∗
t+1)
∂At+1
= u′
(
cu∗t+1
)
. This equation holds
for equality in the absence of borrowing constraints while in the presence of binding borrowing
constraints the left hand side is strictly greater than the right hand side.
Given that
∂V Et+1(A
∗
t+1)
∂At+1
> 0, s∗t ≥ 0, and r ≥ 0, the Euler equation implies that u′ (cu∗t ) ≥
δ (1− s∗t )u′
(
cu∗t+1
)
for all t and this inequality holds strictly if s∗t > 0 or 1 + r > 1. This equation
also implies that δt
∏t
i=1 (1− s∗t )u′ (cu∗t ) ≥ δT
∏T
i=1 (1− s∗t )u′ (cu∗T ) for all t. Therefore,
u′ (cu∗0 ) ∆b0 +
T∑
k=1
δk
k∏
i=1
(1− s∗i )u′ (cu∗k ) ∆bk ≥
T∏
i=1
(1− s∗i )u′ (cu∗T )
T∑
k=1
∆bk
and whenever s∗t > 0 for at least one period or r > 0, this inequality holds strictly. Moreover,
given that equation 6
∑T
k=1 ∆bk = 0, this inequality implies that the ﬁrst part of equation 7 is
positive:
u′ (cu∗0 ) ∆b0 +
N∑
k=1
δk
k∏
i=1
(1− s∗i )u′ (cu∗k ) ∆bk ≥ 0
and the inequality holds strictly if s∗t > 0 for at least one period or if r > 0.
Now we derive the expression for ∆G. By total diﬀerentiating the government budget we get
the following expression:
0 =
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
∆G+
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
∆Stbt +
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
St∆bt +
T∑
t=1
(
1
1 + r
)t
∆Stτw.
where we specify that taxes and deﬁcit are kept constant. This leads to the expression in the
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proposition:
∆G =
∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t
St4bt∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
∑T
t=14Stbt∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
∑T
t=14Stτ∑T
t=1
(
1
1+r
)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
mechanical UI spending increase UI spending decrease increase in tax revenue
caused by the reform caused by shorter UI spell caused by ﬁning job sooneer
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